exchange of prisoners between Hamas in Gaza

On 11 October 2011 a final deal of exchange of prisoners between Hamas in Gaza and the Israeli Government took place with Egyptian Mediation efforts. The deal marked a success on behalf of the interim government of Egypt. An Israeli soldier, Gilat Shalit, then 19, was abducted on 25 June 2006 by a joint force of Palestinian militants who tunnelled under the Gaza-Israel border, ambushing an Israeli army post. He stayed in captivation for almost 5 years by Hamas. In exchange for Shalit, Israel agreed to release 1027 Palestinian prisoners, among them leaders in Hamas. The first stage of the swap took place on 18 October 2011 when Israel released 477 Palestinian prisoners when Shalit physically reached Israel. While agreeing to release these prisoners, Israel pledged to lift the long lived siege on the Gaza Strip.
If the deal is considered a success to both Hamas and Israel, it might be seen at representing a shift in the Egyptian leadership in the Palestinian Cause. Ismail Hanya, the Chief of the dismissed Palestinian Government in Gaza, thanked the revolutionary Egypt for its role in leading the negotiations and assuming the responsibility of the Great Egypt in sponsoring the Palestinian will.
While attempting to figure out the implications of the Shalit deal on the internal affairs of Egypt and the posture of its interim government on all levels; nationally, regionally and internationally, Mr Ahmed Tohamy, a researcher in the school of Government and International affairs at Durham University, he confirmed, “the timing of the execution of the deal was chosen prudently by all parties, not only Hamas and Israel but also the Egyptian mediator. The timing was good; for Netanyahu who is seeking internal legitimacy to face the criticism of the left against his neoliberal policies and the threats to the Israeli national security especially after the tensions with turkey, for Hamas who is seeking legitimacy over Fatah after the attempt to have a full membership at the UN. As for the Egyptian party, we discover that the timing coincided with the events in Maspero. Yet, he said it is somehow difficult to consider that this coincidence was meant to happen, but it was used to the best. The new Egyptian system that was formed after the revolution aspires for building new popular legitimacy in order to better the image of SCAF internally and externally. The pending issues like Shalit Case presented an opportunity to turn it into gains and new legitimacy in the internal affairs.” He stated, “negotiations process of that issue requires a long time and from a theoretical and historical perspectives the Arab Israeli conflict was always an important tool in affecting the internal affairs; whether to gain popular legitimacy through assembling the people behind the political leadership as long as it faces an external threat or through insinuating that amazing achievements on the external affairs that relatively cover up the failure in the internal policies.”
Moreover, when considering the effect of the deal on the Egyptian role in the Palestinian quest, Mr. Tohamy said, “after the 25th of January revolution, the Egyptian politics is attempting to play an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which bestows upon it internal legitimacy and covers up the internal failures and regardless of the fact that the Palestinian Cause is an issue of national security for Egypt, but it is also used to bring popular support.” He added, “This was evident in the Egyptian efforts to bring into fruition the national reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas on one hand, and the prisoners deal on the other. In fact, Cairo wants to get rid of the bad reputation it has acquired during Mubarak’s ruling that it has been in complicity with Israel and wants to build a new role as a partner to the Palestinian party that can play the effective role of moderating between it and Israel.”
He stressed, “The United States and Israel need an active Egyptian role in that cause and there is an international strategic decision to support the Egyptian regime and SCAF. This was evident in the persistence to prevent the escalation of tension after storming the Israeli embassy in Cairo and the Israeli apology for the killing of the Egyptian soldiers on the borders and a blind eye was turned on many of the internal policies.” He added, “this role became more crucial especially after the Syrian revolt and the decline in the Syrian role in supporting the Palestinian opposition, which is also an important factor in bringing Hamas to the negotiating terms and is changing their hostility with Mubarak’s regime to a more partnership terms with the new regime in Egypt to the point of negotiating opening an office to represent Hamas in Cairo. This is serving the latter in seeking the approval of the Islamist factions in Egypt.” From her point of view, Sherine Elghatit, Professor of Political Science at AUC, “the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo was directed against the Egyptian Government more than Israel. People were mad at the interim government for not taking a strong stand towards the death of the Egyptian soldiers. As for the exchange of Prisoners, the timing was a surprise. But it says a lot about the Israeli policies in the wake of the Arab Spring and the realization that things won’t be always on their own terms, they had to find a another way to proceed that is why we have witnessed such rapid developments on that front.”
As for the Security in Sinai, Mr. Tohamy stated, “in the recent years, Sinai is suffering from strategic and security vacuum, which comprises a predicament to all parties. This situation tempts many of the Salafist, Jihadist, regional and international security services to play an active role in Sinai. The recent incidents with the continuous attacks on the gas pipelines, the violence in Arish and Eilat operations all indicate the presence of new players in the Peninsula. This dilemma stems from the Peace Treaty of 1979 that restricts the Egyptian freedom in deploying more troops in Sinai. Yet, the negative impacts of these incidents on Israeli interests and security make the Israeli government, though hesitant, more open to negotiations aiming at increasing the Egyptian Army troops there. Moreover, a friendly Hamas will collaborate with Egypt in order to control the passage of Jihadist members from Gaza into Sinai. Hence, we can consider the last breakthroughs a shift in the Egyptian policy toward Hamas, but it is early to judge its parameters. And to sum up, the last events took place because of the interests involved to the other parties, not only the Egyptian efforts and definitely, if the internal situation in Egypt is more solid, we would achieve much more in our external affairs.”